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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN-JUST COMPENSATION FOR
A LESSEE'S RENEWAL EXPECTATION-Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
To clear the way for construction of a dam, the United States con-
demned petitioner Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Company's
(Almota) leasehold in three-quarters of an acre of land located near
the Snake River in the State of Washington. Only the leasehold was
condemned since the underlying fee had been previously purchased by
the government. When condemned, 7 years of Almota's 20-year
leasehold remained. The condemned leasehold was the last in a series
of renewals of the original lease executed in 1919. In reliance on this
history of renewals, Almota had constructed substantial permanent
improvements' on the leasehold in order to pursue more profitably its
business of purchasing, storing and shipping grain produced locally.2
The expected life of these improvements extended substantially be-
yond the duration of the lease term.
The lease contained neither a condemnation clause nor a right of
renewal. The lease did provide that the petitioner must remove all
improvements within 6 months after the expiration of the lease or
such improvements would become the property of the fee holder.
At trial, Almota argued that the government should be required to
compensate a lessee in the amount for which the leasehold could have
been sold in the open real estate market-a sum that would have in-
cluded a value representing Almota's expectation of renewal. The
government maintained that compensation should be based only on
the fair market value of Almota's legal rights in the leasehold-the
7 years that remained of the lease term.
The district court accepted Almota's theory of valuation,3 but was
1. The most significant improvements were a 522,500-bushel grain elevator
and a large grain warehouse, which were erected immediately adjacent to the former
fee holder's (Oregon-Washington Railroad and Navigation Company) railroad
tracks. Although it is not clear from the Court's opinion, these improvements
were probably constructed during the current lease that would have been up for
renewal in 1974.
2. The former fee holder had a continuing business relationship with
petitioner whereby the railroad shipped the grain that petitioner stored. The series
of lease renewals was evidently based upon this mutually advantageous
business arrangement.
3. 409U.S. at472.
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reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4 The Supreme
Court reinstated the district court's judgment. Held: Just compensa-
tion for a leasehold bearing improvements owned by the lessee is mea-
sured by what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller for the
leasehold, taking into account the possibility of renewal. Almota
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470
(1973).
I. BACKGROUND
Generally, when a leasehold is condemned, the lessee5
is entitled to a sum which will adequately compensate him for his pe-
cuniary loss as the result of the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main. The fair market value of the balance of the demised term has
been ordinarily held to afford such compensation ....
The fair market value of an existing leasehold is generally measured
by what a willing buyer will pay to a willing seller for the use and
occupancy of the leasehold for the balance of the lessee's term.; Con-
sideration must also be given to the lessee's right of renewal, if any,
and a deduction made for the rent remaining over the term of the
lease. The courts have consistently held that this formula requires the
lessee to demonstrate a legal right to renew, such as a binding option
in the lease, not merely an expectation of renewal. 7 The courts have
adhered to this rule even in cases where the lessee could prove that the
expectation of renewal was well justified and had market value.8
In the leading case, United States v. Petty Motor Co., the Court
affirmed this general rule:9
4. United States v. 22.95 Acres of Land. 450 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1971).
5. J. SACKMAN. NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.42[3] (rev. 3d
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; see cases cited therein.
6. S. SEARLES, A PRACTICAL GUIDE To THE LEGAL AND APPRAISAL ASPECTS
OF CONDEMNATION 21 (1969), defines fair market value generally as:
The highest price estimated, in terms of money, which the property will
bring, if exposed for sale in the open market by a seller who is willing,
but not obliged to sell, allowing a reasonable time to find a buyer who is
willing, but not obliged to buy, both parties having full knowledge of all uses
to which it is adapted, and for which it is capable of being used.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946): Emery
v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 59 N.E. 763 (1901): Stroh v. Alaska
State Housing Authority, 459 P.2d 480 (Alas. 1969). See also note II infra.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co.. 327 U.S. 372 (1946): Scully v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1969).
9. 327 U.S. 372, 381 (1946).
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The measure of damages is the value of the use and occupancy of the
leasehold for the remainder of the tenant's term, plus the value of the
right to renew in the lease of Petty, less the agreed rent which the
tenant would pay for such use and occupancy.
Although Petty Motor had an option to renew, also involved in the case
was the condemnation of several leaseholds whose lessees, although
lacking any right to renew, had proven a justifiable expectation that
their leaseholds would be renewed. However, as the Court noted,
"The fact that some tenants had occupied their leaseholds by mutual
consent for long periods of years does not add to their rights."'10
As was true of the lessees in Petty Motor, Almota's expectation that
the lease would be continually renewed, coupled with the presence of
valuable improvements, formed the basis of the valuation dispute
between the government and Almota. 11 The government's theory of
valuation would not have compensated Almota either for its expect-
ancy of renewal or for the value of the improvements past the term of
the lease. Almota argued that it should be compensated for the "real"
market value of the leasehold, i.e., the amount Almota could have
received on the open real estate market. The difference between the
government's valuation and Almota's higher valuation-$144,625-
10. Id. at 380 n.9.
11. As the Court put the issue:
Whether, upon condemnation of a leasehold, a lessee with no right of renewal
is entitled to receive as compensation the market value of its improvements
without regard to the remaining term of its lease, because of the expectancy
that the lease would have been renewed.
409 U.S. at 473. It is interesting to note that this phrasing of the issue was
accepted by the Court exactly as stated by the government in opposing the grant
of the petition for certiorari. Id. at 473 n.l. The issue as expressed by Almota
is set out below for the sake of comparison:
In awarding just compensation to a tenant in the condemnation of a leasehold
interest in real property, including tenant owned building improvements and
fixtures situated thereon, may an element of great inherent value in the
improvements be excluded merely because it does not, by itself, rise to the
status of a legal property right.
Id. (emphasis the Court's). In Almota's phrasing of the issue it is
implicitly recognized that the real issue was whether an expectancy could be
accorded, for compensation purposes, the status of a property right. The
Ninth Circuit saw that question to be the crux of the issue:
The question which we must answer in the instant case is "Does the
word 'property' in the Fifth Amendment sense of the Constitution of the
United States ..... .include hopes and expectations, even those so well
grounded that they have market value?"
450 F.2d at 127. This writer believes that the Ninth Circuit's inquiry-whether
an expectancy is "property" under the fifth amendment-is the most incisive
approach to the problem, and one which leads tho the correct resolution of the
issue. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
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reflected a willing buyer's expectation that the lease would be renewed
and that he would be entitled to the full use of the improvements. 12
The Court accepted Almota's theory of valuation and in so doing
ignored the long line of precedent in which courts have held that the
fair market value of a leasehold should not include the value of an
expectancy. 13 The Almota Court has reversed this general rule, or at
least modified it, where the life of valuable, permanent improvements
constructed by the lessee extend beyond the term of the lease. This
note will examine the reasoning underlying the Court's modification
of the rule and explore the consequences that may result from that
reasoning.
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Almota Court attempted to circumvent the reasoning of Petty
Motor by distinguishing the latter as a case not involving valuable
improvements' 4 and by explicitly denying that it was compensating
Almota for a mere expectancy.' 5 However, as the dissent correctly
points out: 16
[T] he Court permits the same practical result to be reached by saying
that, at least in the case of improvements, the fair market value may
12. By the government's theory of valuation. Almota's leasehold was
worth $130,000. In contrast, Almota's theory of valuation placed the value of the
leasehold at $274,625. The dollar amount produced by each valuation was not
litigated, it was stipulated that each was accurate according to its respective
theory.
13. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946): Scully v.
United States. 409 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1969): Stroh v. Alaska State Housing
Authority, 459 P.2d 480 (Alas. 1969); United States v. 257.654 Acres of Land.
72 F. Supp. 903 (D. Hawaii 1947); Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92. 26 S.E. 489
(1896), Emery v. Boston Terminal Co.. 178 Mass. 172. 59 N.E. 763 (1901):
State v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrig. Dist.. 147 Neb. 289. 23 N.W.2d 300
(1946); Storms v. Manhattan Ry., 178 N.Y. 493, 71 N.E. 3 (1904). Contra,
Mayor of Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 21 A. 181 (1891); In re Acquiring Certain
Property on North river, 118 App. Div. 865, 103 N.Y.S. 908. affd, 189 N.Y. 508.
81 N.E. 1162 (1907). See generally Annot.. 166 A.L.R. 1196 (1947); Annot..
3 A.L.R.2d 286 (1949). See also Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892
(9th Cir. 1944), for a collection of cases where compensation was denied
for disappointed expectations resulting from the revocation of various govern-
ment permits which were legally revocable. On this latter point compare U.S. v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
14. 409 U.S. at 476.
15. The Court asserted that "there is no question here of creating a legally
cognizable value where none existed, or of compensating a mere incorporeal expecta-
tion." Id.
16. Id. at 481 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
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be computed in terms of a willing buyer's expectation that the lease
would be renewed.
The validity of the dissent's criticism appears when one recognizes that
the compensation Almota sought was based not only on what interest
Almota had (the 71/2 years remaining on the lease term), but also on
what Almota might have had (a renewal) in the future.'7 Thus, to
argue the Court is merely requiring compensation for "the fair value
of the property taken by the Government,"' 8 begs the question.
The Almota improvements distinction is illusory because it is
founded upon the fallacious premise that only the improvements are
compensated-not the renewal expectancy. This line of reasoning,
while superficially appealing, ignores the fact that the lease agreement
is the sole source of a lessee's legal right to the use and occupancy of
improvements. Under the lease in Almota the lessee did not have a
legal right to use its improvements after the expiration of the lease.
The only legal right granted by the lease was removal of any or all
improvements within 6 months of the expiration of the lease.' 9
Therefore, in awarding the value of the improvements past the term of
the lease, the Court granted Almota a legal right it simply did not pos-
sess. The net result of the Court's decision in Almota is that an incor-
poreal expectancy is treated as fifth amendment property (i.e., a legal
right), for which compensation is awarded when the leasehold hap-
pens to have lessee improvements erected thereon, but not when im-
provements are lacking.20 Thus, the Almota Court's attempt to distin-
guish Petty Motor is faulty because the Almota decision has the direct
effect of compensating for an expectancy-precisely the result re-
jected in Petty Motor.
In only one recent case, United States v. Certain Property, Borough
17. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
18. 409 U.S. at 476 n.3. For a case which advanced an argument similar to
that used by the Almota Court, see Mayor of Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 311,
21 A. 181, 182 (1891), where the court stated that it was merely requiring com-
pensation for "saleable value of such interest as [the lessee] had."
19. Brief for Respondent at 3, Almota.
20. The Ninth Circuit considered this improvements distinction to be
worthy of no more than a curt dismissal:
We find no merit in Almota's argument that, because there were buildings, the
issue before us is different from what it would have been if there had been
no Laildings.
450 F.2d at 129. See also note 11 supra.
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of Manhattan,21 has a court taken an approach similar to that in
Almota.22 In Manhattan, the Second Circuit noted a number of fac-
tors which indicated that condemnation would deprive the lessee of
value which he would have otherwise retained. 23 The court reasoned
21. 388 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). The panel opinion and the en banc
opinion are reported together.
22. As recently as 1969 in Scully v. United States. 409 F.2d 1061 (10th
Cir. 1969). the Tenth Circuit rejected a lessee's argument that the likelihood of
renewal should be added to the value of the lease, citing Petty Motor as stating
the correct rule. Decided the same year was Stroh v. Alaska State Housing Authority.
459 P.2d 480 (Alas. 1969). in which the Alaska Supreme Court, refusing to com-
pensate for a renewal expectancy and relying on the general rule that a government
need only compensate for a taking of a legal right, asserted that an expectancy of
renewal amounted to no more than "a speculation on chance." Id. at 482.
An improvements distinction was not even discussed in the well-known
Massachusetts case of Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172. 59 NE.
763 (1901), where valuable improvements owned by the lessee were involved. In
Emery, the lessee owned a valuable wharf the life of which extended beyond
the term of the condemned leasehold. The lessee brought suit seeking. inter alia,
to have the value of the expectancy of renewal of the lease added to his dam-
ages. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous court, explicitly rejected this
item in assessing damages. Justice Holmes' words, though often cited in this area.
bear repeating:
It appeared that the owners had been in the habit of renewing petitioner's
lease from time to time, and an attempt was made to give this fact the
aspect of an English customary tenant right. The evidence merely showed
that the landlords and tenants were mutually satisfied and were likely to
keep on together. It added nothing except by way of corroboration to the testi-
mony that they both intended to keep on. Changeable intentions are not an in-
terest in land, and although no doubt such intentions may have added prac-
tically to the value of the petitioner's holding, they could not be taken into
account in determining what respondent should pay. They added nothing to
the tenant's legal rights, and legal rights are all that must be paid for.
Even if such intentions added to the salable value of the lease, the addition
would represent a speculation on a chance, not a legal right.
59 N.E. at 765. Emery was relied upon by the Court in Petty Motor (see
note 10 and accompanying text supra), yet was not considered by the majority
in Almota.
23. Specifically, the en banc majority stated:
We are unable to follow the panel majority in assuming that tenants under
short term leases will generally not be able to derive any value from their
fixtures beyond the expiration of their leases. The contrary is proved not
only by common experience but by the record of frequent lease renewals in
this very case. Lessors do desire, after all, to keep their properties
leased, and an existing tenant usually has the inside track to a renewal
for all kinds of reasons-avoidance of costly alterations, saving of
brokerage commissions, perhaps even ordinary decency on the part of land-
lords. Thus, even when the lease has expired, the condemnation will often
force the tenant to remove or abandon the fixtures long before he would other-
wise have had to. as well as deprive him of the opportunity to deal with
the landlord or new tenant-the only two people for whom the fixtures would
have a value unaffected by heavy costs of disassembly and reassembly. The
condemnor is not entitled to the benefit of assumptions, contrary to common
experience, that the fixtures would be removed at the expiration of the
stated term.
388 F.2d at 601 02, quoted in part in A1nota, 409 U.S. at 474-75.
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since the condemnor was taking this value compensation must be
awarded.24
Both the Second Circuit in Manhattan and the Supreme Court in
Almota failed to recognize that their holdings accord an expectancy
the status of a binding option to renew. This failure caused both
courts to overlook their implicit abandonment of the "legal fight"
definition of the term "property" as used in the fifth amendment, and
enabled them to proceed directly to the tests used for measuring "just
compensation." The error in this approach is that such tests assume, a
priori, that "property" in the fifth amendment sense of the term, was
in fact taken. Thus, the Almota Court's statement that "Petty Motor
should not be read to allow the Government to escape paying what a
willing buyer would pay for the same property"25 begs the ques-
tion. The precise issue which the Court should have addressed in
Almota was whether an expectancy of renewal is fifth amendment
"property," not how to measure the value of property already taken.26
Instead, the Court ignored the issue altogether.
III. SOME PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ALMOTA
A. Landlord-Tenant Apportionment
The Almota Court's elevation of a renewal expectancy to the level
of a fifth amendment property right is likely to have widespread re-
24. The en banc majority of the Second Circuit found unpersuasive the
following reasoning of the panel:
It is true that holdover tenants may in some instances continue to enjoy
their occupancy of premises for long periods of time without the protection
of a lease, but this does not mean that they have a legally protected interest
in remaining and making use of the fixtures. In the absence of some legally
enforceable assurance that they will be able to remain on their rented
premises, we cannot assume that the tenants would be able to derive any
value from their fixtures beyond the expiration of their leases and therefore
there is no basis for giving compensation to any tenant beyond his lease
expiration date.
388 F.2d at 598-99.
25. 409 U.S. at 476-77.
26. By this fusion of the meaning of "property" and the tests for the
measure of compensation, the Court seems to suggest that whatever has
market value is fifth amendment property. Such reasoning is difficult to reconcile,
not only with Petty Motor, but also with Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315
(1932), which stands for the proposition that the "existence of value alone
does not generate interests protected by the Constitution 'against diminution
by the government .... " 287 U.S. at 319. See also U.S. v. Willow River Power
Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945). In addition, the Court in Almota seemingly
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percussions. In future condemnation proceedings, compensation must
be awarded where the lessee can reasonably demonstrate that the life
of his improvements may extend beyond the term of the lease and can
also demonstrate a renewal expectancy. Hypothesizing the usual situa-
tion in which the government has condemned both the fee and the
leasehold, the landlord, under the "unit rule" of valuation, 27 stands to
receive less of the total award for condemnation of the fee simple. This
result is dictated by Almota in that once a lessee is able to demon-
strate that he owns improvements, the value of the renewal expectancy
belongs to him.2 8 Such a result is undesirable because it "would
allow the tenant to diminish the share of the landowners on the
strength of the latter having entertained an intention [to re-
new] they were free to change if they chose." 29
Of course, this result is unnecessary if the Supreme Court subse-
quently limits A lmota to cases where only the leasehold, and not the
entire fee, is condemned, and does not extend it to cases where an
abandons the clear distinction between property and value it had formulated in
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson. 319 U.S. 266 (1943). See note 31 infra.
Moreover, it is difficult to see how this mixture of "property- and the tests
to measure its value could be other than deliberate, given the clear distinction
between the two by the Ninth Circuit, see note II supra, and the reasoning of
Judge Waterman in the panel opinion in Manhattan. See note 24 supra.
27. Basic appraisal principles require that where, as here. the fee simple
is divided into separate interests, the fee is valued as an undivided unit
(hence the term "'unit rule") and the total award apportioned among the interest
holders. 2 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 113.
120 (2d ed. 1953). For an explanation of that apportionment, see note 28 infra.
28. This is contrary to the general rule under which the lessee is entitled
to the portion of the total award that equals the market value of his leasehold.
less the agreed rental over the remainder of the lease term (reserved rental).
See text accompanying note 10 supra. The landlord is entitled to the remainder
of the total award. In the usual apportionment case, the agreed rental either is
equal to or exceeds the market value of the leasehold; hence the lessee usually
gets little or nothing for his leasehold. However, where the entire lease parcel
is taken, the lessee is relieved of his covenant (implied or express) to pay
the rent. See generally NICHOLS, note 5 supra, § 12.42[ 1]; 2 L. ORGEL. VALUATION
UNDER THE LAwoi EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 113, 120 (2d ed. 1953).
Occasionally, the market value of the leasehold exceeds the reserved rental.
In such cases the lessee is entitled to the excess over the reserved
rental-the so-called "bonus value" of the leasehold. In Almota, the excess
value (or "'bonus value") was due to the construction of the improvements
and the use of those improvements in an ongoing grain storage and shipping
business.
It should be kept in mind that Ahnota is not an apportionment case, for the
government did not acquire the underlying fee by condemnation. The government
condemned only Almota's leasehold estate and the case is concerned only
with the compensation to be paid to Almota as lessee.
29. Stroh v. Alaska State Housing Authority. 459 P.2d 480, 482 (Alas. 1969).
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apportionment is required between a landlord and his tenant. How-
ever, such a limitation would mean that a renewal expectancy would
have value when the government condemns a leasehold interest, but
not when the landlord would be compelled to shoulder the burden by
accepting a diminished share. Such a result hardly seems fair to the
government.
B. Compensation for Loss of a Business or Lost Business
Opportunities
A major weakness of the Court's reasoning in Almota is the diffi-
culty which will be encountered when the issue of compensation for
loss of a business or lost business opportunities confronts the Court.30
Certainly it is true that the owner of a business can suffer grievous
loss due to condemnation. It is also true that while both loss of a busi-
ness and lost business opportunities have been held to be not com-
pensable in past Supreme Court decisions, 31 both may, at times, have
market value. Logical consistency demands that the Court award
compensation for these items where market value can be demon-
strated since the government should not be allowed "to escape paying
what a willing buyer would pay for the same property. '32
30. The Court attempted to discourage any inference that its decision will
allow for compensation of business losses or lost opportunities by noting
simply that such compensation was not put in issue:
The only dispute in this case is over how [lessee's] improvements are
to be valued, not over whether Almota is to receive additional compensation
for business losses. Almota may well be unable to operate a grain elevator
business elsewhere; it may well lose the profits and other values of a
going business, but it seeks compensation for none of that.
409 U.S. at 475-76 n.2.
31. Loss of a business was held to be noncompensable in Mitchell v.
U.S., 267 U.S. 341 (1925). Loss of business opportunities was held to be
noncompensable in United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
In Powelson, the government had condemned land as part of the site of a
dam. In doing so the government had ruined Powelson's plans to unite the
tract taken with other tracts and construct four dams as part of a hydroelectric
project. Powelson claimed that the destruction of his business opportunities
ought to be compensated. The Court rejected his argument saying first that
"[ilt is 'private property' which the Fifth Amendment declares shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation" and that "the sovereign must
pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities which the owner may lose."
Id. at 280, 282. The Court went further and ruled: "That which is not 'private
property' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment likewise may be a thing
of value which is destroyed or impaired by the taking of lands by the United
States." Id. at 283.
32. 409 U.S. at477.
203
Washington Law Review
The reasoning in Almota is especially inconsistent in this context
with Mitchell v. United States.33 In Mitchell the government con-
demned land that was specially adapted to the owner's business of
producing a particular, high quality corn. Since it was acknowledged
that the owner could not replace the specially adapted land and begin
anew, the government taking of the land constituted the taking of an
ongoing business as well. On appeal, the owner argued that he should
be compensated for the loss of his business which had substantial
market value apart from the value of the land. The Court held that
since the taking of the owner's business was an "unintended inci-
dent"3 4 of condemnation, the value of the business was not recover-
able.3 5 However, if, as the Almota Court ruled, the basic standard is
that compensation must be based upon what a willing buyer would
pay in the open market (i.e., "real" fair market value), then Mitchell
should be overruled since a willing buyer would certainly have paid
for Mitchell's ongoing business.3 6
C. Overcompensation
The Court's reasoning in Almota also has the effect of overcompen-
sating a lessee. As an implicit modification of the no-compensation-for-
a-business rule, the government, since Carlock v. United States,37
has compensated for the "business value" of lessee improvements, but
only for the term of the lease.:38 The lessee's improvements have a
33. 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
34. Id. at 345. It should be clear that in AlInota the taking of the lessee's
improvements was also an "unintended incident" of condemnation. The purpose
of the condemnation was not to acquire Almota's improvements, but rather to
acquire the land for "the Little Goose Lock and Dam, a river improvement and
navigational project on the Snake River below Lewiston. Idaho." 450 F.2d at
126.
35. In so holding, the Court was in accord with the general rule denying
such recovery. See I L. ORGEL. VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 74 (2d ed. 1953). But see Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731. 146 S.E.2d
884 (1966); State Road Dep't v. Bramlett, 179 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1965) (loss of
business allowed as separate item of recovery).
36. This point was noted by Justice Rehnquist. dissenting in Alnota:
"In either Mitchell or Powelson, the result would in all probability have been different
had the Court applied the reasoning that it applies in this case." 409 U.S. at 484.
37. 53 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
38. In Carlock, the court put forth what it called the "universal rule":
The present money value of a leasehold interest is the present market value of
the residue of the term yet to run with reference to the most valuable use or
uses to which the same may be lawfully put; that is. what would be its present
204
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"business value"3 9 equal to the economic value that an ongoing busi-
ness adds to the improvements.40 Thus, in an indirect way, the
Mitchell rule is tempered by compensating for this special kind of
business loss when a lessee's improvement is taken in condemnation.
However, awarding the business value of improvements over the term
of the lease as in Carlock produces a different, more justifiable
result than awarding the business value of the improvements after the
expiration of the lease as Almota suggests. After the expiration of
the lease, the business value of permanent improvements ought to be
substantially reduced because the business is no longer supported by a
legal property right (i.e., a lease or an option to renew). By departing
from the rule that only legal rights must be recompensed and
awarding the full business value of improvements41 without a sup-
porting property right, the Court overcompensated Almota by
ignoring this reduction in business value.42
D. Other Compensation Problems
Further problems emerge from the Pandora's box opened by Al-
mota. First, under the Court's "willing buyer-willing seller" rule, it is
not clear that the lessee would be compensated only in the amount
money worth over and above the obligations of the lease, to an assignee or pur-
chaser willing and able to assume and perform the obligation of the lease for the
residue of the term ...
Id. at 927-28. The court explained:
This does not mean that appellant is not entitled to compensation for the cost of
the improvements, but only to the extent that they have enhanced the market value
of the lease over and above the obligations of the lease .... In other words, in
determining the market value of the lease, after the expiration of two years, the
value of the improvements to the premises for leasing purposes for the remairing
eight years would be a proper matter for consideration.
Id. at 927.
39. "Business value" is the author's term for the compensation rendered under the
formula of Carlock and similar cases.
40. In short, in Almota, the 0.75 acre and the improvements erected thereon with-
out the ongoing grain storage and shipping business would have been worth very little
since the market value of the leasehold was largely dependent on the business made possi-
ble by the specialized improvements.
41. The full business value is necessarily awarded under the Court's
analysis in Almota; in an arms-length transaction a "willing buyer" would
have paid for the full business value of the improvements.
42. The Court, in effect, assumed that the business could continue even
though there was no legal basis (in the form of a right to renew) for that
assumption. Thus, the Court awarded an amount which far exceeded the limited
"business value" compensation formulated in Carlock.
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that a willing buyer would have paid for the life of the improvements
extending beyond the term of the lease. The Court professed to re-
quire compensation for only the improvements, 43 but it seems quite
clear that a "willing buyer" in the open market would have paid not
only for the improvements but also for the expectancy that he would
have the use and occupancy of the leasehold beyond the life of the
improvements. Thus, the Court's reasoning requires compensation,
not only for the improvements beyond the life of the leasehold, but
also for the full value of the renewal expectancy-the result perceived
by the Ninth Circuit and the dissent, but not by the majority. 44
However, even if it can be assumed that compensation is limited to
the life of the improvements, the Court fails to mention how the life of
these improvements will be measured. As the Ninth Circuit and the
dissent in Almota inquired, "[W] as the stipulation [of value] based
upon some actuarial computation such as the prospective life of the
buildings and machinery, or the life of the [fee holder], or
upon free-ranging guesswork?" 45 To avoid the uncertainty involved
in estimating the life of improvements and to arrive at a more con-
crete principle of valuation, the Court must depart from its "willing
buyer-willing seller" language in Almota and specify factors to be
considered in compensating for improvements; e.g., the original cost
of the improvement, whether it was erected in contemplation of renewal,
the nature of the improvement and the business (if any) for which it
was used, the extent to which the improvement can be salvaged, and
what value the lessee has already derived from the original cost of
construction. These factors all focus on the lessee and the injustice he
may suffer from an unforeseen condemnation and are not concerned
with the result under a hypothetical agreement involving a willing
seller and willing buyer.
Unfortunately, if the Court chooses to adhere to its willing
buyer-willing seller test, it cannot logically avoid compensating for the
entire expectancy; a willing buyer's expectancy of renewal will seldom
stop at the life of the presently situated improvements. Such a buyer
will surely have the expectation that the improvements will be re-
placed as they wear out and that he will have the benefit of future re-
43. 409 U.S. at 475-76 n.2.
44. Id. at 481.
45. 450 F.2d 125, 129 (9th Cir. 1971). quoted at 409 U.S. at 485 (Rehnquist. J..
dissenting).
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newals as well. It seems evident that the Court was concerned with the
apparent unfairness of depriving the lessee of the value of the im-
provements,46 and hence inflicting unforeseen losses. If so, it would
seem much simpler to formulate a rule that would compensate the
lessee for the value of the use and occupancy of the improvements for
the term of the lease, and then would add to that amount the re-
maining value of the buildings as measured by the original cost of the
improvements, less straight-line depreciation over the term. While this
formula would probably provide the lessee with less compensation
than he might receive from a willing buyer under the Court's analysis,
it would have the virtue of producing more readily ascertainable
values.47
IV. CONCLUSION
Almota is constitutional law; consequently its future impact is likely
to stretch beyond its strict, factual setting.48 Certainly the stage is now
set for a direct challenge to Petty Motor and the rule that was con-
46. It does seem unfair to take a lessee's improvements and pay him in
return the use-value for only the balance of the term. Clearly, when the lessee
erected his improvements he expected to get full use of them; i.e., beyond the
end of the term. The fact that Almota had the right to remove its improvements
was of little value to it since in this case such removal meant destruction of
the improvements. The salvage value of the buildings did not even approach the
value of the buildings for that part of their useful life which extended beyond the
end of the term. See 409 U.S. at 47 1.
47. This course would be more certain because it focuses on the lessee
and the ascertainable costs he may suffer from condemnation. By so focus-
ing this method avoids trying to attach value to what some unknown willing
buyer would have paid for the leasehold in a hypothetical agreement containing
unknown terms and conditions. This process should also presen little
or no unusual evaluation problems since it uses procedures established
under Petty Motor for valuing the remainder of the lessee's term. Likewise,
the lessee's original expenditure in constructing the improvements and the
remaining worth of the improvements as measured by straight line depreciation
should be easily ascertainable. The use of the straight line method in arriving
at the remaining worth of the improvements is preferable since it is easily
calculated and spreads the cost of the improvements out more evenly. In sum,
this alternative course would compensate the lessee for the value (including
business value) of the improvements over the term of the lease and would
allow him to recover most, if not all, of the original construction cost of the
improvements. In essence, the lessee would lose nothing except perhaps the
opportunity to realize a profit (or a loss) by selling his leasehold on the open
market.
48. See, e.g., Bembinster v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 277, 203 N.W.2d 897, 900 (1973),
where the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited Almota in support of this proposition:
While possibilities of factors affecting value may be speculative, probabili-
ties are not. Just compensation in condemnation proceedings is measured
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sidered settled in Mitchell-that loss of a business is not a separately
compensable item of recovery in a condemnation proceeding. If car-
ried to its logical extreme, Almota may give credence to Justice Doug-
las's fear (in another context) that by departing from settled doctrine
and introducing a large element of uncertainty into an area of law, the
Court has given the Constitution "an interpretation which promises
swollen verdicts which no Act of Congress can cure.."49
Such uncertainty is sure to arise in the aftermath of Almota, for by
abandoning the legal rights definition of fifth amendment property,
the Court has launched the lower courts upon the now uncharted seas
of hypothetical willing buyers and willing sellers, negotiating hypo-
thetical agreements involving unknown terms and conditions. As dem-
onstrated in this note, such a test leads to compensation for difficult-
to-measure expectancies which could affect the "fair market value"
of a leasehold. In short, under Almota anything which has a fair mar-
ket value is fifth amendment property-at least for condemnation pur-
poses. Uncertainty aside, such a rule will indeed lead to "swollen
verdicts."
However, it may well be argued that such a rule does, in fact, rep-
resent "just compensation." Indeed, if the rule does not prove too
unmanageable, it may result in the body public, for the first time,
shouldering all economic costs of public acquisitions. Clearly, the
public is better able than individual owners to bear those costs hereto-
fore uncompensated under Petty Motor and Mitchell. If such is to
become the rule, the Court should so state in a decision that carefully
weighs the policy considerations which may support such a doctrine.
Such a course is surely preferable to the strained reasoning and the
dubious distinctions adopted by the Court in Almota.
Mark W. Pennak
by what a willing buyer would pay for the land taking into account the probability
of an access road or of a change in zoning or other factors affecting the
value of property.
49. United States v. General Motors Corp.. 323 U.S. 373. 385 (1945) (Douglas.
J., concurring). General Motors involved government condemnation of an
unexpired leasehold interest in a warehouse used in lessee's business. In
ruling for the lessee (who had alleged that it had received insufficient compensa-
tion), the Court held, inter alia, that the reasonable cost of removing lessee's
stored property to clear the space for the government should be included in the
award. Justice Douglas objected that such costs are consequential losses
which are not compensable under the fifth amendment as construed in Mitchell
v. United States. 267 U.S. 341 (1925): United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson.
319 U.S. 266 (1943). It was this departure from the rule that consequential
damages are not compensable which Justice Douglas saw as promising
"'swollen verdicts."
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